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Utah Governmental Immunity Act and Government
Hospitals: Condemarin v. University Hospital
I.

INTRODUCTION

Among the most valuable rights afforded to Utah citizens under
the Utah Constitution is the guarantee of "uniform operation" of "[a]ll
laws," 1 where "every person . . . shall have remedy by due course of
law" for injuries suffered. 2 These important rights can be diminished
or abrogated by governmental immunities. However, governmental immunity statutes which appear overly burdensome are subject to judicial
review to determine whether the means used to obtain the given objective are justified. The Utah Supreme Court recently was asked to put
this ends/means analysis to the test in evaluating the fairness of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act 3 (the "Utah Act") as it applies to
government-owned hospitals and health care facilities in Condemarin
v. University Hospital. 4 The Utah Act holds government-sponsored
hospitals and health care facilities immune from liability for personal
injury beyond $250,000. ~
This note analyzes the Condemarin decision in light of the changing legal attitudes toward governmental immunity, specifically for hospitals and health care providers. First, the note briefly reviews the
background of the Utah Act. Next, the note evaluates the different approaches submitted by the separate opinions of the Utah Supreme
Court justices in Condemarin. Third, trends on the issue of government immunity for government-owned hospitals and health care facilities are discussed. Finally, the note concludes that while the majority
arrived at the proper outcome in Condemarin, it provided too little
guidance on how the Utah Act will be interpreted in the future with
regard to state-funded hospitals and health care facilities other than
University Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah.

1. UTAH

CoNST.

art. I, § 24.

2. UTAH

CONST.

art. I, § 11.

3. UTAH

Com:

ANN. § 63-30-1 to -38 (1986 & Supp. 1989).

4. 77 5 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989).
S UTAH CODE ANN.§ 63-30-34(1) (1986 & Supp. 1989). Prior to 1983, the damages recovery cap was $100,000, which is the figure applied in this specific action. Condf!narin, 775 P.2d at
348 n.l.
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UTAH GovERNMENTAL IMMUNITY AcT

Sovereign immunity generally provides governmental entities with
special protection from tort liability, except in cases where the federal,
state or local government has consented to be sued. 6 The doctrine dates
back to the eighteenth century, having its roots in the simple philosophy
that "the king can do no wrong." The state feared "an infinity of actions" if it allowed itself to be sued. 7 This special protection found its
way into American and Utah common law by providing immunity for
acts performed as governmental functions. 8
The doctrine of governmental immunity is not new to the state of
Utah. In 1966, the Utah Legislature codified governmental immunity,
excepting all governmental entities for injuries resulting from "the exercise and discharge of a governmental function." 9 As Utah law evolved
in this area, the Utah Supreme Court developed several tests dealing
with the statutorily vague term "governmental function," and determined in Greenhalgh v. Payson City 10 that the operation of a hospital
was not a governmental function. 11 Two years later, Cornwall v. Larsen12 further limited the application of the Utah Act to the governmental entity itself, refusing to expand the scope of protection to the individual governmental employees. 13
In apparent reaction to these decisions, the Utah Legislature
amended the Utah Act in 1978 to effectively reverse both the Greenhalgh and Cornwall decisions by specifically extending immunity to
government hospitals and health care facilities, 14 and granting personal

6. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 626 (5th ed. 1979).
7. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 600, 305 A.2d 877, 885 (1973)
(quoting Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 672, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362 (1788)).
8. Srr Ramirez v. Ogden City, 3 Utah 2d 102, 279 P.2d 463 (1955).
9. UTAH CooE ANN. § 63-30-3 (1966 amend.).
10. 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975).
11. !d. at 801-02. The court reached its conclusion based upon a multiple-pronged analysis
which considered "whether the activity is . . generally regarded as a public responsibility . .[;]
whether there is any special pecuniary benefit to the City; and also, whether it is of such a nature
as to be in competition with free enterprise." !d. at 801 (footnote omitted). The court also addressed the value of "encouraging a high standard of care" for governmental health care providers.

!d.
12. 571 P 2d 925 (Utah 1977).
13. Irl. at 927. Srr also Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 197S).
14. UTAH Com: ANN. § 63-30-3 (1986 & Supp. 1989). It states:
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a governmental function, f'Ol'fmmnztail)'-Oll'llfli izu,pita/, nuninR homr, or othn· f'Dl'fnunmta/ hralth

m rr fan/it\, awl from an apprm•rd mrdzcal, nursing, or othrr projrssiozwl health
rarr rlimml tmininR f'roRram rondurtrd in rztha puhlir or Jnn•atr jari/itirs.
/d. (emphasis added).
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immunity for their employees. 15 In Condemarin, Justice Durham criticized the Utah Act as a statute singling out "government-owned health
care facilities, out of all the hundreds of government entities," for "retained" immunity for non-governmental functions. 16
Notwithstanding the 1978 amendment, the court, in two subsequent non-hospital immunity decisions, seemed to imply that a government hospital should not be eligible for governmental immunity. First,
in Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corporation/' the court determined
that a public golf course was not a governmental function under the
"essential to the core of governmental activity" test, 18 because the Utah
Act authorizes the purchase of liability insurance to protect against injuries caused while involved in non-essential government activities. 19
The court explained the effect of its decision in Standiford was to
broaden liability for governmental acts. 20 A year later, the court further
expanded general governmental liability in Johnson ''· Salt Lake City
Corporation, 21 where it held that "[ t ]he first part of the Standiford test
. . . does not refer to what government may do, but to what government alone must do." 22 As in Standiford, the court reasoned that the
insurance provisions provided within the Utah Act allow government
entities to "sensibly budget to include insurance premiums for tort
claims arising out of the operation of [the entity ]." 23
While it may seem questionable that the operation of a hospital
would qualify under Johnson as something "government alone must
do," 24 when faced with a government hospital defendant in Frank v.
15. UTAH Com: ANN. § 63-30-4(4) (1986 & Supp. 1989).
16. Condnnarin, 775 P.2d at 350 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). Justice Durham
did not believe governmental immunity was actually "retained" b) government-owned hospitals
under the 1978 amendment to the l!tah Act since this protection was not available "at common
law or under the original version of the Utah Act." !d. But srr id. at 3R3 (Hall, C.J., dissenting)
(expressing the view that the plaintiffs would have had no rights to property or remedies under
the general doctrine of sovereign immunity "as it existed at the time the [state] constitution was
adopted" and that the plaintiffs would therefore have no claim to a "full and unlimited tort recovery" under the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution).
17. 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980).
18. "[T]he test for determining governmental immunity is whether the activity under consideration is of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agency or that
it is essential to the core of governmental activity." !d. at 1236-37.
19. !d. at 1237.
20. !d.
21. 629 P.2d 432 (Utah 1981 ).
22. !d. at 434 (emphasis in original).
23. Stanrhford, 605 P.2d at 1237.
24. !d. A 1985 formal opinion from the office of the Utah Attorney General demonstrated
that services offered by University Hospital were not services uniquely provided by governmental
entities. OP. ATT'Y GEN. No. 85-002 (Oct. 21, 1985) (A planned association between University
Hospital and Primary Children's Hospital would violate anti-trust laws as University Hospital
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State, 26 contrary to its earlier decision in Greenhalgh and as a direct
result of the 1978 amendment, the court held that the operation of University Hospital was a "governmental function." 26 In so doing, the
court held itself bound by the statute as amended by the Utah Legislature.27 Had the court applied the same standard in Frank as set forth
in Standiford, decided six months earlier, it is uncertain whether the
court would have been able to reach the same conclusion. 28 Because
government hospitals compete directly with hospitals in the private sector, such a function is arguably not something "government alone must
do."29
The driving force behind the Utah Act, as amended in 1978, was
the fear that the public treasury might be severely overburdened by
paying out large malpractice claims. 30 However, Justice Durham argued that its practical effect is to give governmental health care entities
and their individual physicians an advantage over those operating in
the private sector, since it is currently unnecessary for the government
entities to budget for malpractice insurance. 31 This advantage is more
apparent in cities where both private and public hospitals compete.
Justice Stewart noted that although community hospitals in rural areas
may need special protection to exist and provide citizens with their only
immediate health care alternative, 32 the court also has the challenge of
balancing the need for making health care available to citizens with
protecting injured patients' rights of recovery for tort claims.

III.

Condemarin v. University Hospital

The issue in Condemarin was whether the Utah Act is a reasonaoperates one of three ''level 3" newborn intensive care units in Salt Lake County which ru rrmtly

romjJr/r u•ilh rarh othn on rqual footing.).
25. 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).
26. !d. The court noted further that while Grnnhalgh held the operation of a municipal
hospital was a proprietary act not covered by governmental immunity, the 1978 Act clearly
demonstrated the Utah Legislature's intent to protect such activities as governmental functions in
the future. !d. at 519.
27. !d.
28. The court's test in Standiford simply had one exception, which had been clearly set forth
under the Utah Act as government-owned hospitals and health care facilities. /d.
29. JohiiiOII, 629 P.2d at 434.
30. Culldernarin, 775 P.2d at 361.
31. !d. at 364. Srr also Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d
845 (197 5). The Washington Supreme Court suggested that a general waiver of government immunity serves the purpose of "plac[ing] the government on an equal footing with private parties
defendant. . . [T]he only function the special treatment given governmental bodies seems to perform is the simple protection of the government from liability for its wrongdoing." !d. at 818-19,
539 P.2d at 850.
32. Condnnarin, 775 P.2d at 372 (Stewart, J., separate opinion).
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ble means of protecting the public treasury 13 when, as a result of its
damages recovery limitation, severely injured plaintiffs who would have
full tort recovery rights against private hospitals are denied full recovery in government-owned hospitals. 34 The means used to resolve this
problem was an issue of debate which greatly divided the Utah Supreme Court.

A.

Facts

The plaintiffs are the parents of an infant child. As a result of
apparent negligent acts of physicians and employees of University Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah, the child will suffer as a severely retarded and handicapped person for the rest of his life. 36 The plaintiff
mother, while in labor, was rushed to University Hospital following
several hours of labor and a suspected rupture of the membranes while
at Cottonwood Hospital, a privately-owned and operated facility in Salt
Lake City. 36 An emergency caesarean section was performed and the
child was found to be "'severely asphyxiated' at birth." 37 The expected
out-of-pocket damages alone could not have been remedied within the
statutory limitation applied. 38

B.

Analysis

The majority in Condemarin, Justices Durham, Zimmerman and
Stewart, held that the Utah Act was "unconstitutional as applied to
University Hospital." 39 While Justices Durham and Zimmerman favored striking the Utah Act as unconstitutional, 40 Justice Stewart limited the effect of the court's decision to University Hospital. 41 By holding the Utah Act unconstitutional strictly as applied to University
Hospital, the majority left the issues of due process and equal protection with respect to damage limitations for government-owned hospitals
33. !d. at 361.
34. !d. at 352.
35. !d. at 349.
36. /d. at 348.
37. !d. This "resulted in 'severe neurologic damage,' including impairments of hearing, sight,
and ability to be fed, as well as seizure disorder and spasticity." !d.
38. !d. at 349. "It is likely that the cost of medical and custodial care related to the severe
neurologic disorder of Leone! Condemarin in its various aspects will greatly exceed the sum of
$100,000." !d.
39. /d. at 366 (This holding was specifically limited to UTAH ConE ANN. § 63-30-34, the
damage limitation section of the Utah Act.).
40. !d. at 366 (Durham, J); id. at 368 (Zimmerman, J, concurring in Part).
41. Irl. at 374 (Stewart, J, separate opinion). He writes: "Whether [the damages recovery
cap of§ 63-30-34] may be constitutional as applied to municipal hospitals and other health care
facilities is a question I leave for another day." !d.

492

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 4

largely unsettled. The Utah Supreme Court justices were divided in
deciding this issue based primarily upon their individual assessments of
the significance of the rights exercised, whether those rights triggered
an equal protection or due process analysis and which level of scrutiny
should be involved.

1.

justice Durham

Justice Durham held the Utah Act unconstitutional, using a balancing test under both an equal protection and due process analysis,u
despite the fact that the plaintiff appealed only on grounds of equal
protection."u She stated that the recovery limitation under the Utah Act
was an unreasonable burden for the public to bear, because it infringed
upon "important constitutional rights,"'' namely, the right to full recovery for personal injuries" 11 and the right to a jury trial." 6 Justice
Durham was in favor of striking the Utah Act as unconstitutional and
providing the legislature another opportunity to work out the presumed
constitutional infirmities. ' 7
a. Equal protection. Justice Durham relied on the Utah Supreme
Court's decision in Malan v. Lewis," 8 in which the Utah Guest Statute
was held unconstitutional as violating equal protection by discriminating against those receiving serious injuries in car accidents.' 9 In Malan,
the court utilized a middle tier balancing test. It held that although it
presumed "the Legislature acted on a reasonable basis, that presumption does not require us to accept any conceivable reason for the legislation."110 Justice Durham believed the court should use such a balanc42. !d. at 352. Under an Pqual pro/Pelion analysis, "a two-part test is necessary . . . .
'First, a law must apply equally to all persons within a class. Second, the statutory classifications
and the different treatment given the classes must be based on differences that have a reasonable
tendency to further the objectives of the statute.'" !d. (quoting Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661,
670 (Utah 1984)). Under a due process analysis, "'every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law'. . . . [T]he clear implication of this language is 'that an individual [may J not be arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies
designed to protect basic individual rights.' " !d. at 357 (quoting Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985)).
43. !d. at 356.
44. /d. at 363.
45. !d. at 360. She referred to this as "an important substantive right." /d. (citing Hunter v.
North Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 814, 539 P.2d 845, 848 (1975)).
46. !d. at 365 (citing International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement,
626 P.2d 418, 421 (Utah 1981)) ("[T]he right of jury trial in civil cases is guaranteed by article I,
section 10 of the Utah Constitution.").
47. Irl. at 364.
48. 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984).
49. Irl. at 671.
50. Malan, 693 P.2d at 671 n.14 (emphasis added).
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ing test in the present case because the rights involved were
"substantial" and "important." 51 In further support of this middle tier
approach, Justice Durham cited the New Hampshire Supreme Court's
decision in Carson v. Maurer, 52 which also identified the right to recover for damages caused by negligence as an "important substantive
right." 113 She reasoned that since the rights to full recovery for malpractice injuries were available against government-owned hospitals under
common law, that the equal protection issue at hand merits a "heightened standard" of review. 114
b. Due process analysis. Because Justice Durham saw that the
traditional rational basis approach would fail to take into account "the
seriousness of the abrogation of personal rights accomplished by the
Act," she suggested that "a more straightforward balancing process is
required." 1111 In a search for more flexibility, she departed from her
equal protection analysis and relied on due process. 116 In so doing, she
referred to the court's two-part test in Berry ·u. Beech Aircraft Corporation,117 which first examines whether the law provides an injured person an effective and reasonable alternative remedy, and then, if no substitute remedy is made available, the taking of the remedy can "be
justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated"
and the means of elimination are not arbitrary. 118 She stated that "because of the constitutional status of the right to a remedy for damage to
one's person under article I, section 11" (hereinafter the "open courts
provision"), scrutiny beyond a rational basis test is thus required. 119
51. Crmrlnnarin, 775 P.2d at 361.
52. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
53. Condmwrin, 775 P.2d at 354 (quoting Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 931, 424 A.2d
825, 830 (1980)) "'Not only is the right to be compensated for injuries closely related to fundamental rights, but additionally, it does not logically fit into the "commercial" rights description
which is characteristic of the rational basis standard of judicial review.'" /d. (quoting Note, Tarp;rt Drjrndan/.1 and Tort Law Rrform: A Prrsprcti<•r on Mrdiml Malpractirr and Mwnripal
Liahilit\', 11 VT. L. REv. 535, 546 (1986) (citations omitted)). In reviewing a Montana governmental immunity statute, the Montana Supreme Court has held that the right to remedy for
injuries under the state constitution is Jundmnmtal, requiring the application of strict scrutiny.
/d. at 359 n.8 (citing White v. State, 203 Mont. 363, 661 P.2d 1272 (1983)); Srr also Jones v.
State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976).
54. Condrmarin, 775 P.2d at 356. Srr supra note 16.
55. /d.
56. /d. at 358.
57. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985).
58. Condrmarin, 775 P.2d at 355-56 (quoting Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d at
680). The alternative remedy required under the first prong must be one which is "substantially
equal in value or benefit to the remedy abrogated in providing essentially comparable substantive
protection . . although the form of the substitute remedy may be different." /d. at 357-58.
59. /d. at 358.
'[T]he Junrtional diffrrrnrr between the rational basis test and the intermediate test is
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This "right to a remedy" is applied to those injured patients who incur
damages at the hands of government health care providers beyond that
provided for in the recovery cap. 60 In further support of her due process approach, Justice Durham asserted that the plaintiffs were denied
their fundamental right of a trial by jury under the Utah Constitution
based on the damages limitation under the Utah Act, although she was
the only justice to make such an argument. 61

2.

justice Zimmerman

In his concurring opmwn, Justice Zimmerman joined Justice
Durham solely on her due process analysis, referring to Condemarin as
"a logical successor to Berry." 62 Despite the fact that the plaintiff did
not directly raise the issue of due process, Justice Zimmerman credited
the plaintiffs with positioning their issues in terms of due process by
arguing the Utah Act infringes on rights protected by the open courts
provision under the Utah Constitution, triggering the Berry analysis. 63
Like Justice Durham, Justice Zimmerman held that the Utah Legislature was not given unlimited power under the Utah Constitution. 64
Justice Zimmerman sought to avoid the rigid nature of the equal protection classification tests which, although neat in application, do not
take into account "the realities that a legislature must face in attempting to deal with perceived social and economic problems." 611
Justice Zimmerman opted to write separately to elaborate his view
on the due process issues involved and believed that the equal protection analysis proposed by Justice Durham was unnecessary and diffithe degree to which the legislative judgment reflected in the statute will be examined.
The prartiml rlif[afllrr is that under the rational basis test the statute will surely be
found constitutional while the opposite result is likely if the intermediate test is
applied.'
!d. at 359 (quoting Richards, Statutrs Limiting Mrdical Malprarticr Dmnaws, 32 FEo'N INS.
CoUNS. Q. 247, 256-57 (1982)) (emphasis added).
60. !d. at 361.
61. !d. at 365 (citing UTAH CoNST. art. I, § 10). "(T]he Utah state constitutional right to
jury trial on the question of civil damages is absolute [and] the absurdly low amount contained in
the recovery limits statutes infringes egregiously on that right." !d. at 366.
62. !d. at 366 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in Part). Justice Zimmerman wrote to expand
his views on the due process issue and expressed no opinion as to other points discussed by Justice
Durham. !d.
63. !d. at 367 n.1. "Bnry teaches that it is precisely due process concepts, rather than th03e
of equal protection, that are involved when rights protected by article I, section 11 are claimed to
have been abridged." !d. (citing Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d at 675-81); srr also
supra note 57.
64. Coll(/rmarin, 775 P.2d at 368 ("there must be some limits on the legislature, that some
interests of the people deserve special protection in the maelstrom of interest group politics that is
the legislative process").
65. !d.

UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
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cult to apply. 66 He thus held that depriving injured individuals the
right to recover actual damages, present and future, because of the tortious conduct of another, is a right which substantially infringes upon
the right of recovery interests protected under the open courts provision.67 However, Justice Zimmerman left the door open for damage
recovery caps on recovery for general damages in the future. 68 His concern with the Utah Act as it currently reads is that it limits actual outof-pocket expenditures for present and future damages. 69
3.

justicf Stfwart

Justice Stewart, in a separate opmton, wrote that he was content
with the court's equal protection approach in Malan, 70 which he authored, and opposed any suggestions by Justices Durham or Zimmerman that due process was at issue "since it has not been raised." 71 He
adamantly stated that the plaintiff raised only two issues, both of which
fell under equal protection, and went so far as to suggest that Justices
Durham and Zimmerman were exercising "substantive due process,"
which actions lead to the "illegitimate exercise of judicial power in the
realm of legislative power." 72
While Justice Stewart was not at ease with the due process analysis suggested by Justices Durham and Zimmerman, neither could he
follow the rational basis standard of equal protection as set forth by
66. Irl. at 366.
67. Irl. at 368-69. The defendant's position that the Utah Act was necessarily based on a
malpractice insurance crisis and the need to protect the public treasury was referred to as "extraordinarily weak" by Justice Zimmerman. !d.
68. Irl. at 369. He writes:
[W]hen the people are deprived of a right to recover actual out-of-pocket expenditures
that have been or will be incurred because of the tortious conduct of another, the infringement upon the right to recover for harm to the person is far more severe and
requires far more justification than when general damages for pain and suffering or
punitive damages are restricted.

!d.
69. Irl.
70. Irl. at 373 (Stewart, J., separate opinion). "The statutory classifications must be reasonable . . and the statute that creates the classification must in fact reasonably and substantially
further the legislative purpose." !d. (quoting Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d at 672-73).
71. Irl.

72. !d. "Justice Zimmerman fails to recognize that it is essentially equality before the law
that equal protection principles further, and not the rationality of legislative ends and means as
such." !d. In rebuttal, Justice Zimmerman wrote:
Justice Stewart is at pains to renounce any suggestion of "substantive due process".
. If there is any doubt that equal protection concepts can be and are used to
produce the same results on essentially the same grounds as a more straight-forward
due process analysis, those doubts should be dispelled by comparing Justice Stewart's
separate opinion with mine.
lrl. at 367 n.l (Zimmerman, J., concurring in Part) (citations omitted).
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Chief Justice Hall and Justice Howe in the dissent. 73 His basic disagreement with the dissent was that he believed, as did Justices Durham
and Zimmerman, that the open courts provision was at issue and, as
such, the higher standard of review as set forth in Malan should be
followed. 74 This analysis allows the court to be more flexible in its
equal protection inquiry, the strictness of the approach "vary[ing] with
the nature of the right or interest discriminated against. " 711 Justice
Stewart wrote that the right to full recovery under the open courts provision was "an important right that ought not to be discriminatorily
abrogated or diminished unless there is a strong countervailing public
interest." 76 The exercise of the strict scrutiny standard endorsed by the
dissent, according to Justice Stewart, "would hobble legislative power
in an unreasonable fashion in an area where strong competing interests
have to be accommodated by legislative policy making." 77
In keeping with the flexibility built into the higher standard of
Malan, Justice Stewart developed a hybrid "practically self-supporting" and competition test, taking into account the degree of public
funding for a government-owned hospital and whether it directly competes with other private hospitals. 78 He noted that University Hospital
received only 3.5% of its operating budget from the legislature, making
it "practically self supporting." 79 In addition, University Hospital competes directly with other hospitals that do not have the benefit of a
limitation on tort recovery, and the patient pays for hospital services
rendered in either instance. 80 Because the defendants were unable to
demonstrate that personal injury awards in Utah have been unduly
large or were on the rise, the three-pronged analysis used by Justice
Stewart81 led him to conclude that University Hospital should not be
treated, as it was in Frank, as acting in a governmental function under
the Utah Act. 82 However, he did not allow his analysis to reach beyond
the present case, because of his belief that "some community hospitals
73. /d. at 373 (Stewart, J., separate opinion).
74. /d. at 370. ("[I]t is plain that Malan applies a higher standard of review than the minimal standard that the Chief Justice applies.").
75. Irl. at 372 (citing Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 674 n.l7).
76. /d. at 373 (citation omitted).
77. /d.
78. !d. at 374.
79. /d.
80. /d.
81. Th rrr-Prongrd Analysis: The Court should look to what degree the public hospital: (I)
receives private funding; (2) competes directly with private hospitals; and (3) charges for identical
services as provided by private hospitals. /d.
82. !d. at 373-74. "There is no reason to conclude that the University Hospital would have
any more difficulty in assuming these costs [providing insurance to cover full legal liability] than
other major hospitals in Salt Lake City and its environs." /d. at 374.
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might
be a governmental function." 83
Justice Stewart's conclusion provides some guidelines for evaluating the Utah Act. Specifically, the Utah Act is unconstitutional as applied to hospitals receiving public funding of less than 3.5%. Unfortunately, the issue remains unresolved as to where the line may be drawn
between 3.5% and 100% public funding.

4.

Dissenting opinion

Chief Justice Hall and Justice Howe adopted a rational basis
standard of review under an equal protection approach in which they
favored "allowing every reasonable presumption in favor of constitutionality."84 Their approach was based on the principle of separation of
powers, placing the burden on the plaintiff to "prove abuse of legislative discretion beyond a reasonable doubt." 811 They agreed with Justice
Stewart that since the open courts provision or the due process clause
issues were not challenged by the plaintiff, the court should not attempt
to force a due process balancing analysis to resolve the issue. 86 Chief
Justice Hall defends his approach, which was challenged by Justice
Durham as one which "would virtually insure that the legislative action will be found constitutional under the [equal protection] rational
basis standard," 87 by relying primarily on federal constitutional law. 88
Justice Hall did not recognize the rights of the plaintiffs as rising
to the level of the severely injured passenger's right to recovery in
Malan, stating that under the given circumstances in Condemarin,
"any level of intermediate review is . . . inappropriate in this case." 89
While deciding to not recognize the heightened standard of review for
equal protection in Malan and arguing for the federal equal protection
standard of review, Justice Hall seemed to be in conflict with the
court's holding in Mountain Fuel Supply ''· Salt Lake City Corporation,90 where it held:
State courts . . . have a long tradition . . . of being far less willing to
83. !d. at 372.
84. !d. at 377 (Hall, C.J, dissenting) (footnote omitted).
85. !d. (footnote omitted).
86. !d. at 378. Chief Justice Hall states that Justice Durham's opinion "fashions and imposes a due process analysis in order to challenge the subject legislation. In doing so, it ignores
established principles of judicial review to reach a desired result." !d.
87. !d. at 357.
88. !d. at 378 (Hall, C.J, dissenting). He believes the rigid rational basis standard does not
insure a finding that the legislation is constitutional, as suggested by Justice Durham. !d. (citing
Ryszkiewicz v. City of New Britain, 193 Conn. 589, 479 A.2d 793 (1984)).
89. /rl. at 384.
90. 752 P 2d 884 (Utah 1988).
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find that legislative classifications underlying economic regulations are
reasonable . . . . As a result, to pass state constitutional muster, a

legislative measure must often meet a higher de facto standard of
reasonableness than would be imposed by the federal courts. 91
This higher standard, together with the suggested higher equal protection standard in Malan, suggests that perhaps the rational basis standard sponsored by the dissent may not be appropriate.
In Malan, the court reasoned that the Utah Guest Statute could
not have served its stated purpose of promoting hospitality because, for
one thing, "most drivers know nothing about the Guest Statute." Likewise, passengers not knowing the risks they are taking by accepting a
ride, do not realize they are giving up rights against the driver of the
car in the event of an accident. 92 Under Chief Justice Hall's argument
in Condemarin, he might well have upheld the Utah Guest Statute in
Malan, where the court reasoned that the statute could not be justified
based on the legislative fear of fraud and collusion on insurance
companies. 93
There are some similarities between the facts in Malan and Condemarin. Both deal with statutes which discriminate against those seriously injured by tortious conduct. 94 Just as the passengers were unaware they were giving up their rights under the Utah Guest Statute,
the plaintiffs in Condemarin were unaware that they were giving up
important rights of recovery by transferring from a private to a governmental-owned hospital. Because the defendants were unable to establish
support showing a malpractice insurance crisis, or demonstrate an inability of government-owned hospitals to purchase liability insurance to
justify the Utah Act, it seems that had Chief Justice Hall and Justice
Howe followed Malan, they would have joined the majority at least as
far as Justice Stewart did.

IV.

TRENDS IN OTHER STATES

The Condemarin decision demonstrates the difficulty courts have
with the constitutional issues surrounding governmental immunity as
applied to health care. The primary challenge in many instances is in91. !d. at 889 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
92. Mnlruz, 693 P.2d at 673. "[A driver's] hospitality in offering a ride is based on considerations that have nothing to do with the existence of the Guest Statute. Even if the Guest Statute
encouraged drivers to offer rides, it would also discourage guests from accepting rides." !d.
93. !d. at 674.
94. /d. at 664 (Passengers paying for rides under the Utah Guest Statute preserved the right
to full recovery, while non-paying passengers were completely barred from recovery unle" intoxication or willful misconduct of the driver could be shown.).
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terpreting "governmental function" within statutes. Any underlying
constitutional issues will surface once the statutory or judiciary interpretation has been made.

A.

Gor,ernmmtal Immunity for Hospitals

In 1986, the Michigan Legislature resolved the issue of indemnification for government-owned hospitals in Michigan, which had previously caused years of division in the Michigan Supreme Court. For
example, the Michigan Supreme Court held in Parker '1 1• City of Highland Park, 95 that since a hospital was "essentially a business . . . ,
there is no rational ground upon which immunity for a governmentoperated hospital can rest." 96 The court developed the "essence of government" test in resolving the question of what is a "governmental
function." 97 This test is similar to the Standiford test, requiring an
activity to be "of such a peculiar nature that it can only be performed
by government." 98 The Michigan court was faced with another opportunity to interpret "governmental function" under its governmental immunity act in Ross ''· Consumers Power Company, 99 which defined
"governmental functions" as "whenever its activities are expressly or
implied!)' mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, or other
law." 100 The Michigan Legislature later codified the Ross definition of
"governmental function." 101 Based on the latter definition, the Michigan court then held in Hyde '1'. Uni< 1ersity of Michigan Board of Regents/02 that the University of Michigan Hospital, as a public general
hospital, was engaged in a governmental function and therefore immune under the state's operating governmental immunity statute. 103 In
Hyde, the court considered two additional tests: the proprietary tesrl 04
95. 404 Mich. 183, 273 N.W.2d 413 (1978).
96. Jd. at 195, 273 N.W.2d at 417 (footnotes omitted).
97. Jd. at 194-95, 273 N.W.2d at 416-17.
98. lrl. This test was essentially overruled by Ross v. Consumers Power Co., 420 Mich. 567,
363 N.W.2d 641 (1984). Srt Hyde v. University of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 426 Mich. 223, 257,
393 N.W.2d 847, 862 (1986). Justice Ryan, in his dissent in Parlin, endorsed a "common good of
all" test, which examines whether government activities of patient care are in the public's best
interest. 404 Mich. at 203, 273 N.W.2d at 421 (Ryan J., dissenting).
99. 420 Mich. 567, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984).
100. Hwlr, 426 Mich. at 243, 393 N.W.2d at 855 (quoting Ross, 420 Mich. at 620, 363
N.W.2d at 661) (emphasis added). Hydr notes that the "governmental functions" definition "is
broad and encompasses most of the activities undertaken by governmental agencies." Jd. (quoting
Ross, 420 Mich. at 621, 363 N.W.2d at 661).
101. Jd. at 245, 393 N.W.2d at 856 n.16.
102. 426 Mich. 223, 393 NW.2d 847 (1986)
103. ld. at 243, 393 N.W.2d at 856 (emphasis added).
104. 426 Mich. at 260, 393 N.W.2d at 864 (The proprietary test considers whether "the
primary purpose of the activity is to produce a pecuniary profit and that the activity is not nor-
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and the competition test. 1011
The same year the Michigan Supreme Court decided Hyde, the
Michigan Legislature amended the Government Tort Liability Ace 06
to specifically exclude the "operation of a hospital or county medical
care facility [and its] agents or employees." 107 This amendment was no
doubt a welcome relief, since the holdings of the Michigan courts on
this issue had become so unpredictable. Thus, Justice Williams suggested that those "possibly affected . . . had better seek protection either through insurance or through legislative redefinition. " 108
The Kansas Supreme Court held over twenty years ago that governmental immunity for hospitals and medical personnel is inappropriate in Carroll v. Kittle/ 09 where the University of Kansas Medical
Center was not allowed immunity. 110 The court reasoned that patients
in government-owned hospitals should be able to expect the same standard of care as at private hospitals. 111 However, it should be noted that
the court, in so abolishing governmental immunity, recognized the legislature's power to resurrect the doctrine later by statute. 112
As early as 1952, the State of Florida held in Suwannee County
Hospital l'. Golden, 113 that a statute purporting to render a public,
nonprofit hospital corporation organized by the state immune from liability for negligence and torts of its officers, agents, and employees, in-

mally supported by taxes or fees.").
105. !d. at 255, 393 N.W.2d at 861 (The competition test considers whether the hospital
"actively competes with other health care providers for both resident and nonresident patients.").
106. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1407(4) (West 1986) (MICH. STAT. Ar-;N. §
3.996(107)(4) (Callaghan 1986), riiNI in Hyde v. University of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 426 Mich.
at 277, 393 N.W.2d at 871 n.l (Archer, J., dissenting)).
107. !d.
108. ~1urray v. Beyer Memorial Hosp., 409 Mich. 217, 224, 293 N.W.2d 341, 343 (1980)
(Williams, J., concurring).
109. 203 Kan. 841, 457 P.2d 21 (1969).
II 0. !d. The court held:
Our forefathers did not fight the Revolutionary War because they were of [the) opinion
[that "the king can do no wrong"). Their reasoning was quite to the contrary. It is
difficult for us to believe that they would carry over into their common law a principle
so opposed to their basic belief.
!d. at 846. 457 P.2d at 26 (citing Wendler v. City of Great Bend, 181 Kan. 753, 316 P.2d 265
(1957))
Ill. !d. at 850, 457 P.2d at 29. The court stated:
[A) patient who pays for professional services ought to be entitled to the same protection and the same redress for wrongs as if the negligence had occurred in a privately
owned and operated hospital. If thr gm'friWtrnt is to nztrr into busines.1t.1 ordinarily

rrsnwrl to theJielrl ofjnil'ale nztrrprise, it should be held to the same rrsfJOnsibilities
and lirzhilitir.l.
!d. (emphasis added).
112. !d. at 847, 457 P.2d at 27.
113. 56 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1952).
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eluding doctors and nurses, was unconstitutional. 114 Since that holding,
numerous other states have followed, some courts abolishing the doctrine as established by the judiciary and others striking legislative
statutes.w1

B.

Governmental Immunity zn General

1.

judicially established immunity

Modern trends demonstrate a movement towards the abolition of
governmental immunity. The Arizona Supreme Court overturned the
judicially established governmental immunity doctrine in Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 116 thereby abolishing any kind of damage
limitations whatsoever. 117 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court abolished
its judicial government immunity doctrine, calling it a rule of law that
has been "long since devoid of any valid justification" 118 by imposing
the "entire burden of damage resulting from the wrongful acts of the
government . . . upon the single individual who suffers the injury,
rather than distributed among the entire community constituting the
government, where it could be born without hardship upon any individual, and where it justly belongs." 119 The Alabama Supreme Court
likewise abolished its judicial government immunity doctrine in Jackson
v. City of Florence. 120 However, the Alabama court recognized the leg114. !d. at 913 (implying that equal protection rights of patients are endangered).
115. Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hasp., 417 Pa. 486, 493-94,208 A.2d 193, 197 (1965) ljudzcial dortrinr of governmental immunity for government hospitals was abolished based on the rationale that government must accept the same risks as private business when taking on a business
enterprise.); Sides v. Cabarrus Memorial Hasp., 287 N.C. 14, 24, 213 S.E.2d 297, 303 (1975) (A
hospital is liable in tort for negligent acts committed by its employees.) ("[T]he doctrine of immunity as applied to governmental hospitals is being incrmsingly abandonNI by stair courts.") (emphasis added)); Chandler v. Hospital Auth. of Huntsville, 500 So. 2d 1012 (Ala. 1986) (A statutr
providing immunity for government-owned hospitals "unconstitutionally deprived tortiously injured hospital building authority patients of [the remedies] available to tortiously injured patients
of other public health facilities."). But srr Dunlap v. University of Ky. Student Health Servs.
Clinic, 716 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1986) (A statutr which protects government hospitals to the extent
that they are covered under the University of Kentucky Medical Center Malpractice Insurance
Act was constitutional.).
116. 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963).
117. !d. at 387, 381 P.2d at 109 ("[W]hen the reason for a certain rule no longer exists, the
rule itself should be abandoned."); sn also Nelson v. Maine Turnpike Auth., 157 Me. 174, 170
A.2d 687 (1961) ("[S]overeign immunity from tort liability has served its usefulness and ought to
be destroyed.").
118. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584,587,305 A.2d 877,878 (1973)
(citations omitted) ("In so doing, we join the ever-increasing number of jurisdictions which have
judicially abandoned this antiquated doctrine.").
119. !d. at 592-93, 305 A.2d at 881 (quoting Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 88,
136 P.2d 480, 482 (1943)).
120. 294 Ala. 592, 320 So. 2d 68 (1975). "Alabama joins a growing number of states in

502

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 4

islature's authority "to enter the entire field, and . . to provide with
proper legislation any limitations or protections it deems necessary." 121

2.

Statutory go·vernmental immunity

State courts, as a general rule, have an easier time abolishing governmental immunity as a judicial doctrine than when it is codified by
statute. 122 Issues of separation of powers often arise, as they did in
Condemarin/ 23 when courts consider striking legislative acts, which allow damage limitations or otherwise provide immunity for certain governmental entities, on constitutional grounds.
Recently, the Washington Supreme Court held that the state's
1986 Tort Reform Act, 124 which limited non-economic damages recoverable by personal injuries or wrongful death actions, was a violation of
its citizens' right to a trial by jury, preserved under its state constitution.1211 In striking the statute, the Washington court held that "[ t ]he
Legislature['s] . . . power to shape litigation . . . has limits," which do
not extend into a jury's right to "the determination of the amount of
damages." 126 The court had earlier expressed its disdain for damage
limitations in Hunter v. North Mason High School, 127 when it held:
[W]e cannot uphold nonclaim statutes simply because they serve to
abolishing governmental immunity as to various governmental units." !d. at 599, 320 So. 2d at 74
(citations omitted). Wyoming and Missouri likewise abolished governmental immunity prior to
1980. Oroz v. Board of County Comm'rs, 575 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1978) (abolished for all claims
arising after July 1, 1979); Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977) (abolished as to all claims arising on or after August 15, 1978).
121. /d. at 600, 320 So. 2d at 75. See also Davies v. City of Bath, 364 A.2d 1269, (Me.
1976). "Although we may question the efficacy of a policy that allows a municipality to determine
the extent of its own liability, it is not our duty to judge the wisdom of legislative enactments." /d.
at 1271 (quoting Shapiro Bros. Shoe Co. v. Lewiston-Auburn Shoeworkers Protective Ass'n, 320
A.2d 247, 257 (Me. 1974)).
122. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that when a "controverted rule is not the creation of the Legislature[,] [t]his [c]ourt fashioned it, and, what it put together, it can dismantle."
Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 503, 208 A.2d 193, 202 (1965).
123. 'This principle, that we necessarily avoid addressing and striking down statutes pursuant to constitutional grounds, especially those not urged by the parties, honors the doctrine of
separation of powers . . and exists notwithstanding . . . the personal desires of this court or its
justice to determine policy or rectify perceived wrong." Condnnarin, 775 P.2d at 377 (Hall, C.J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted). SPr also Campbell v. Pack, 15 Utah 2d 161, 389 P.2d 464 (1964).
"[I]t should be left entirely to the legislature to determine whether the immunity should be removed; and as to what agencies; when effective, and to what extent, if any, limitations should be
prescribed." /d. at 465.
124. WASH. REv. CoDE§ 4.56.250 (1986) rited in Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d
636, 771 P.2d 711 (1989).
125. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711 (1989) (The Act was
established "as a response to rising insurance premiums for liability coverage.").
126. /d. at 651, 771 P.2d at 719.
127. 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975).
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protect the public treasury. Absent that justification, there is no basis,
substantial or even rational, on which their discrimination between
governmental plaintiffs and others can be supported. They thus cannot stand under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 128

A damage limitation statute in Virginia, limiting medical malpractice actions to $1,000,000, was held unconstitutional as a violation of
the plaintiff's right to a jury trial under the seventh amendment of the
United States Constitution in Boyd v. Bulala. 129 In so doing, the federal district court held that "the legislature may [not] constrict the right
to a jury trial." 130
The general rule for a court's power to strike down a statute was
recited by the Kansas Supreme Court in Kansas Malpractirr Victims

Coalition ''· Brll: 131
Before a statute may be stricken down, it must clearly . . . violate[]
the Constitution. Moreover, it is the court's duty to uphold the statute
under attack, if possible, rather than defeat it, and if there is any
reasonable way to construe the statute as constitutionally valid, that
should be done. 132

On this issue, Justice Stewart, in his separate opinion in Condrmarin,
referred again to Malan and stated, "the great latitude allowed the
Legislature in making classifications under the minimal scrutiny standard is not appropriate when a constitutional right is discriminated
against." 133 At least as applied to Condemarin, Justice Stewart agreed
that the Utah Act could not withstand constitutional scrutiny. 134 However, striking the statute, as suggested by Justice Durham/ 35 was a
step beyond what Justice Stewart believed was necessary to resolve the
issue before the court. 136 Rather than defending the Utah Act with the
128. /d. at 818-19, 539 P.2d at 850. "We follow a growing number of courts in holding that
the arbitrary burden placed on state claimants by this type of statute cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny." /d. at 850-'i 1.
129. 672 F. Supp. 915 (W.D Va. 1987).
130. lrl. at 921. The court explained that the history of the Seventh Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution demonstrates that "the right to a civil jury trial was intended to serve as an important
check upon the legislature and the judiciary." lrl. at 919.
131. 243 Kan. 333, 757 P.2d 251 (1988).
1'l2. /d. at 340, 757 P 2d at 256-57. But srr Suwannee County Hosp. v. Golden, 56 So. 2d
911 (Fla. 1952). "An enterprise is not governmental in chararter simply because the government
enters it or the Legislature declares it so. Whether it be governmental or proprietary depends on
the nature of the bminess and the determination of the courts." Jd. at 913.
133. Cr11r•ZI'Inorin. 775 P.2d at 373 (Stewart, J., separate opinion) (citing Malan v. Lewis,
693 P 2rl ;H 0(•') (IJtah 1984)).
134. Jrl. at 375.
135. Irl. at 31>4.
136. lrl. at 374 (Stewart, J., separate opinion).
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kind of zeal suggested above by the Kansas Supreme Court, Justice
Zimmerman believed the court "should give the legislation and its justifications careful scrutiny to assure that redress of legally cognizable injuries is not unreasonably impaired." 137 Meanwhile, Justice Hall
would have followed the admonition of the Kansas Supreme Court and
left the entire matter in the hands of the legislature. 138
V.

CoNCLUSION

It is unfortunate that the justices were so divided as to the rights of
the injured plaintiffs in Condernarin. The court's objective in adopting
the Standiford test was to "allow more innocent victims injured by tortious conduct on the part of public entities access to the courts for redress."139 While this objective is praiseworthy, the fact remains that
patients suffering severe injuries in government-owned hospitals in
Utah have few, if any, guarantees for a full recovery. Prior to assuming
public office, former Utah Attorney General David L. Wilkinson believed the Utah Act as amended in 1978 was "unconstitutional on its
face" for denying an injured person a remedy in violation of the open
courts provision. 140 Had the plaintiffs in Condernarin not been transferred to the government-owned University Hospital and the negligence
taken place at the private Cottonwood Hospital, they would have preserved the right to full recovery for any tort committed by Cottonwood
Hospital and its employees. However, the transfer to University Hospital essentially stripped the plaintiffs of any recovery above the damages
limitation. Therefore, while the plaintiff would have had a full remedy
under the law in one instance, such remedy was denied in the
second. 141
While the result of the court's decision in Condernarin was equitable in light of the plaintiff's circumstances, the result gives little guidance to future plaintiffs injured in government-owned hospitals and
health care centers. It should, however, put government-owned hospi137. /d. at 368 (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (suggesting the Utah Act be stricken).
138. !d. at 386 (Hall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). "It is the legislature's function to
structure statutory provisions capable of protecting the public interest by fairly and reasonably
reimbursing victtms while maintaining governmental services by realistically evaluating the financial burden to be placed on the taxpayers." /d.
139. Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1237 (Utah 1980).
140. Wilkinson, ThP Utnh GO!'nmnmtnl Immunity Art ns AmmdPd by HousP Bill Xumbn
14, 6 UTAH B.J. 27, 32 (Fall-Winter 1978).
141. The unfairness of the Utah Act under the circumstances of Conrlnnnrin prompted Justice Durham to address the need for preserving a high standard of care in medicine, whether it be
practiced by the government or in the private sector. Condnnarin, 775 P.2d at 364. "[D]eterrencerelated concerns . . . have traditionally been viewed as central to influencing the behavior of medical professionals." Irl.
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tals on notice that the damage caps and individual immunity they have
enjoyed under the Utah Act for the past twelve years may be in jeopardy. The Utah court has demonstrated the difficulty in upholding a
statute, such as UTAH CoDE ANN. § 63-30-3, which specifically protects one sector of a service industry while allowing it to compete directly with the private sector.
The next plaintiff challenging the Utah Act under similar circumstances has much to consider. If, for example, a due process challenge
would have been made based on the open courts provision, it is quite
possible that the court may have come together under its Berry analysis,
resulting in a decision providing more clarity to the issues presented in
Condemarin. Whether the dissent would have been open to a due process approach under Berry is very unclear. In addition, although Justice Stewart did not favor such an approach in Condemarin/ 42 he may
be more open to a due process analysis if the issue is raised unambiguously by the parties.
The constitutional rights potentially infringed upon under damage
limitation statutes, such as the Utah Act, will likely continue to test
state courts around the country. When these issues reach the Utah Supreme Court again, Justice Stewart may provide the swing vote if an
equal protection argument surfaces, depending on the outcome of his
hybrid "practically self-supporting" and competition test. 143

Michael A. Royal

142. Condflnarin, 775 P.2d at 369 (Stewart,
143. !d. at 374.

J.,

separate opinion).

